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“You may know a truth, but if it’s at all complicated, you have to be 
an artist not to utter it as a lie.” 
-Iris Murdoch, An Accidental Man 
I. Introduction 
International law may be unable to boast primacy in the value of attention it 
receives as a pedagogical endeavor, but it can certainly depend on the exceptional gravity of that 
attention.1  In a colorful recounting, international law teaching competes with the worst aspects 
of sex and the weather in that many “think they are expert[s]; they complain about problems, but 
do nothing to improve the situation.”2  This is not exactly true, as what unites diagnostic 
accounts of international law teaching is not the absence of reform proposals.  Rather, it is an 
enduring preoccupation with the institutional, if not necessarily ontological, identity of 
international law in legal education and its assignment to the periphery of academic visibility. 
Corresponding to the resilience of this concern is a literature that has survived the 
seasonal winds of scholarship fashion since at least the 1950s.3  Across diverse academic 
locales,4 reflecting on particular historical phases,5 and differing at times in thematic emphasis,6 
seasoned and occasional teachers of international law have consistently called for new ways to 
present the field in an ever more integrated market of practice.  If a perception of international 
1 I use ‘international law’ to avoid the anachronism of ‘public international law’ and also to leave room for 
application of virtue theory to international legal pedagogy in general, but my topical discussion in this essay will 
centre around ‘public international law’ in response to the volume of attention it has received across generations of 
international law teachers. 
2 John Gamble, Teaching or Get off the Lectern: Impediments to International Law Teaching, 13 ILSA J. Int’l & 
Comp. L. 379, 379 (2007). 
3 For a list of sources with an emphasis on Australian and Canadian works see, Gerry Simpson, On the Magic 
Mountain: Teaching Public International Law, 10(1) Eur. J. Int’l L. 70, 70 (1999 FN 2. 
4 See e.g., Ivan Shearer, The Teaching of International Law in Australian Law Schools, 9 Adelaide L. Rev. 61 
(1983); BS Chimni, Teaching, Research and Promotion of International Law in India: Past, Present and Future, 5 
Sing. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 368(2001); Hikmahanto Juwana, Teaching International Law in Indonesia, 5 Sing. J. Int'l 
& Comp. L. 412 (2001); Isaak Dore, The International Law Program at Saint Louis University, 46 J. Legal Educ. 
336 (1996); Diane Penneys Edelman, It Began at Brooklyn: Expanding Boundaries for First-Year Law Students by 
Internationalizing the Legal Writing Curriculum, 27 Brook. J. Int'l L. 415 (2002);  
5 See e.g., Michael Reisman, The Teaching of International Law in the Eighties, 20(3) the International Lawyer 987 
(1986). 
6 See e.g. John C. Knechtle, Innovative Ways to Teach International Law, 97 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 217 (2003); 
Diane Otto, Handmaidens, Hierarchies and Crossing the Public--Private Divide in the Teaching of International 
Law, 1 Melb. J. Int'l L. 35 (2000); John A. Barrett, International Legal Education in the United States: Being 
Educated for Domestic Practice While Living in a Global Society, 12 Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 975 (1997). 
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law’s peculiar identity inspired the older accounts,7 the changing face of legal education in light 
of market demands and challenges to those demands stir contemporary analyses.   
Yet aside from variation of emphasis, the expanding literature has scarcely 
surpassed some of the insights of the older accounts in providing a meaningful outlook to 
international law pedagogy.  The contemporary reactions continue to advance a largely self-
fulfilling iteration of constant discontent with the field’s rank and recognition in legal education.  
It remains as true now as it was three decades ago, as one such reflective account put it then, that 
there is no state of emergency or grim exception disabling international law education and that 
the institutional knots and ties instead ought to be taken as an urging force for creativity and 
alternative thinking.8  In an equally compelling observation, Gerry Simpson warned against 
theoretical incoherence and depoliticization of the subject matter as a result of compromises that 
international law teachers often make in response to the perceived pedagogical, jurisprudential 
and functional inferiority of the field.9  These accounts are significant because their diagnoses 
and suggested remedies reject the sui generis status of international law and instead call for 
imaginative encounters with the possibilities that rules, doctrines, institutions and context offer to 
international legal education.  They do so, however, by engaging with and challenging the 
assumptions of a peculiar and particularly undervalued disciplinary identity that prompt such 
extraordinary preoccupations in the first place. 
But disciplinary existentialism may have well run its course.  As this brief essay 
suggests, when reflecting on pedagogy in international law, we might do well to shift our gaze 
from the subject matter to the agent.  An agent-based approach to the teaching of international 
law is not closed to existential considerations – the multiple personae of people with projects 
bear evidence to that after all.  My interest here is nevertheless in a broader sense of agency than 
mere identity.  As a preliminary attempt to entertain the interrelated frameworks of agency and 
virtue in international legal thinking, I take aid from virtue epistemology to point to a new 
approach to responsible and responsive pedagogy.  The word ‘virtue’ might carry moral 
connotations and seem irrelevant to the acquisition of knowledge.  In a broader sense, however, 
for virtue epistemologists virtue refers to human character traits, skills, and dispositions that 
normatively shape our cognitive connection to the world.10  As suggested here, a virtue-based 
account of knowing can provide an attractive normative framework to evaluate pedagogical 
choices. 
Scholarly and pedagogical observational standpoints differ and can be defined to 
a reasonable degree, but to what extent and how may they justifiably delimit the teacher’s 
discretion over methodological and substantive choices that she makes?  Do we have a more 
reliable tool than the subjectivism of identity narratives to measure the success of our practice in 
an ‘invisible college’ of traveling minds who rise from the Global South and teach in the North 
and vice-versa?  How to evaluate the pedagogical good (and possible harms) in unavoidably 
popular methodological approaches and styles such as interdisciplinarity and experientialism 
beyond their definite marketability?  Might we sacrifice some crucial faculties in our pupils if 
we, for instance, allow our scholarly passion to overrule the practical wisdom of encouraging 
                                                          
7 For an illustrative example, see especially Roundtable on the Teaching of International Law: Proceedings of the 
Eighty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 85 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 102 (1991). 
8 David Kennedy, International Legal Education, 26 Harv. Int’l L. J. 361, 384-5 (1985). 
9 Simpson, supra note 3. 
10 See e.g., Virtue Epistemology: Contemporary Readings, John Greco and John Turri, eds., (2012). 
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dissent?  But isn’t dissent, too, subject to rules of epistemic responsibility?  What, if anything, 
does responsible pedagogy have to do with coherence of our legal and political positions inside 
and outside of the classroom in between different scholarly and advocacy roles?  And what about 
teaching from a critical standpoint as an overarching label? 
Neither this essay nor virtue pedagogy has all the answers, but a virtue account 
offers new avenues for a more reflective stance on international law as an intellectual medium 
through which to relate to the world.  Firstly, it directs the focus away from ontology to 
epistemology – although serious ontological (and methodological) questions are inevitably 
present – and thereby treats international legal studies as a mature endeavor deserving of difficult 
questions about knowledge that otherwise never see the light of day in a perpetual and tediously 
exaggerated state of disciplinary identity crisis.  Secondly, it can afford an integrative approach 
to coherence in knowledge and ethics – in knowing and doing, in scholarship and teaching and 
so forth – without the baggage of moralizing foundations.  Thirdly, precisely because of that 
integrative capability, a virtue-based approach can account for ‘experience’ – individual and 
otherwise – as a determinative factor in both pedagogical and scholarly choices without the 
danger of unrestrained subjectivity.  Lastly, because it reconciles intellectual demands and 
dispositional traits, it makes no claim to having a hegemonic pedagogical blueprint and instead 
allows for responsible creativity. 
With those promises, let us now turn to a brief outline of virtue epistemology 
before assessing its connection to a responsible, virtue-based approach to pedagogy. 
 
II. Virtue Epistemology  
Virtue theory,11 broadly speaking, centers on a number of important questions 
that are rooted in the Aristotelian virtue ethics tradition – the significance of agents as well as 
choice and action in moral theory, virtues, dispositions and character, moral discernment or 
wisdom, the role of emotions in our moral life, a deep concept of flourishing or happiness, and 
the fundamental questions of how one should live one’s life and what sort of person to be.12  
Virtue epistemology, in part influenced by the revival of interest in virtue ethics, gives epistemic 
or intellectual virtue concepts a central role in addressing questions of epistemic justification.13   
                                                          
11 I deliberately avoided ‘virtue theory’ and used a more neutral phrase of ‘virtue account’ so far, because the former 
is taken to refer to considerations of virtue in dominant deontological and utilitarian moral traditions as well as to 
virtue ethics in particular.  Having eclipsed in the 19th century in favor of the two dominant moral traditions in 
Western philosophy, virtue ethics was revived in the late 1950s by G.E.M. Anscombe in Modern Moral Philosophy, 
33 Philosophy (1958).  This in turn led to development of various forms of virtue ethics inside and outside 
deontological and utilitarian approaches.  Martha Nussbaum, in Virtue Ethics, A Misleading Category? 3 The 
Journal of Ethics 163 (1991) provides a lucid account of this complexity to reject a trichotomous taxonomy in which 
virtue ethics is regarded as a third, distinctive category against Kantians and utilitarians.  Even though the relation 
between virtue epistemology and virtue ethics (an hence a clear account of the latter) is important, for the purposes 
of this essay, I am not concerned with clear designations and so use virtue theory or account in a broad sense to refer 
to a focus on virtue as reflected in the accompanying text. 
12 In Ancient Greek philosophy, these are excellence or virtue (arête), moral or practical wisdom (phronesis), and 
happiness or flourishing (eudaimonia).  For a helpful account see Julia Annas, Intelligent Virtue (2011). 
13 The first application of virtue epistemology was in Ernest Sosa, The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus 
Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge, V Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3 (1980). 
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In defining the place of epistemology, philosophers are cognizant of its once-
upon-a-time philosophical life when skepticism was a nemesis worthwhile to refute.  It was the 
philosophical threat of skepticism that in principle warranted theorizing about knowledge.14  But, 
for modern epistemology, there are additional concerns or “problem-areas” that call for 
epistemological inquiry as a distinctive enterprise.  One of those problem areas is the question of 
the value of knowledge, that is, if it should be of any importance for us to set knowledge as a 
goal, or the only goal, of inquiry, to answer the question of “knowledge for what?,” and to know 
when and how we are justified to say ‘we know.’  Those who believe knowledge requires 
justification mostly adopt either a foundationalist or coherentist approach to the structure of 
justification.15  Virtue epistemology, in contrast, shifts the focus from justification and 
evaluation of beliefs to that of the intellectual character of the agent, “so that knowers, or would-
be knowers, come to bear as much of the onus of credibility as ‘the known’ has standardly 
16borne.”  
racter of the agent, and those cognitive characters 
are epistemic o
us with forms of intellectual virtue to inspire 
intellectual flo 20
and epistemic responsibility, refined intellectual character traits such as open-mindedness, fair-
                                                          
A basic commitment of virtue epistemology, then, is to locate and evaluate 
epistemic credibility in intellectual agents and communities.  The normative property of an act of 
cognition is measured against the cognitive cha
r intellectual virtues and vices. 
A second and related tenet of virtue epistemology is that epistemology is in 
essence a normative discipline.17  For some epistemologists, that simply means the basic 
epistemic concepts of knowledge, justification and virtue can only be defined adequately in 
normative vocabulary,18 while for others it implies an educational or practical mission for 
epistemology to nurture our intellectual well-being by, amongst others, helping us to recognize 
modes of “epistemic injustice”19 or furnishing 
urishing or cultural reformation.  
What exactly constitutes intellectual virtues turns on whether they are regarded by 
epistemologists merely as a critical means conducive to intellectual flourishing or as both a 
critical means to intellectual well-being and partly constitutive of that.  Cognitive faculties such 
as memory, perception, and introspection, for instance, as reliable and stable means of getting to 
the truth, define intellectual virtues for epistemologists who are concerned with virtue-based 
analysis of knowledge.  But for those who are concerned with cognition’s ethical implications 
14 See generally ALFRED JULES AYER, THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE (1956). 
15 The problem of justification is as follows: every belief C must be inferentially justified by a belief E, which in 
turn needs to be justified by another belief F, which needs to be justified by yet another belief G, ad infinitum. 
Foundationalism would have the regress end with some empirically basic or non-inferentially justified beliefs in no 
need of further justification.  The coherentist, on the other hand, considers justification to be inferential in a circular 
or weblike, rather than linear, manner.  See e.g., Michael Williams, Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction 
to Epistemology, 81-90, and 117-23 (2001). 
16 Lorraine Code, Epistemic Responsibility, 8-9 (1987). 
17 This is in opposition to Willard Van Orman Quine’s suggestion, in Epistemology Naturalized in ONTOLOGICAL 
RELATIVITY AND OTHER ESSAYS, 80 (1969), that the questions of justification and what to believe should give place 
to cognitive psychology. 
18 See e.g. Linda Zagzebski, On Epistemology (2009). 
19 Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (2007). 
20 Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood, Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology (2007). 
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mindedness, tenacity, thoroughness, and conscientiousness, rather than cognitive faculties, make 
up intellectual virtues.21 
This is not, and ought not to be, a sharp taxonomy.  A complete epistemology 
plausibly requires both faculty and character trait virtues.  The former are indispensible to giving 
us access to existing knowledge and the world around us, and the latter to facilitating richer 
intellectual achievements such as wisdom and understanding that may go beyond mere 
knowledge.22  It is nonetheless epistemologists’ attention to intellectual character traits that 
suggests some exciting and non-traditional epistemic possibilities. 
One such attempt broadens the scope of epistemology by urging a focus on 
personal and social aspects of cognitive life and by considering epistemic responsibility as chief 
among intellectual virtues.23  Under another account, the chief intellectual virtue is epistemic 
conscientiousness, which is a desire to reach truth and avoid error.24  Additional intellectual 
virtues such as impartiality (including openness to opposing ideas and a lively sense of one’s 
own fallibility), intellectual sobriety (as opposed to the enthusiast who is likely to embrace what 
is not really warranted), and courage (including willingness to explore alternatives to popular 
beliefs, perseverance against opposition until one is convinced that one is mistaken, and 
determination to see such new inquiry through the end) are required to regulate a desire for truth 
since that desire is not a virtue on its face and could be compatible with vices of fanaticism and 
dogmatism.25  Concerned with the social aspects of knowledge, a third account points to virtue 
epistemology’s disregard of a distinction, long made in virtue ethics, between self-regarding and 
other-regarding virtues.  Perceptual acuity and intellectual courage promote the individual’s own 
intellectual flourishing, while the agent’s honesty and integrity promote others’ intellectual 
flourishing by enabling her to clearly communicate her reasons to others or demonstrate 
creativity to discover knowledge new to a community.26   
Along the lines of social and historical concerns, some have argued for a genetic 
or social approach to epistemology, which instead of focusing on knowledge at a particular point 
in time, considers the cognitive life of the mind developed in a social context.  Under this 
account, virtues help shed light on the cognitive life of the mind and its socialization as they also 
play a central role in defining cognitive ideals in context.27  A thorough grasp of the 
development of cognitive ideals requires attention to concepts such as “social patterns of 
mimicry and imitation” and “the importance of training and practice in learning how to search 
for the truth.”28  It also accounts “for the superiority from an epistemological point of view of 
certain communities and the bodies of knowledge they generate,” and hence for considering why 
physics and scientific educational material, for instance, are more respectable than astrology.29 
                                                          
21 These two views are known as ‘virtue reliabilism’ and ‘virtue responsibilism’ respectively. 
22 Linda Zagzebski, Recovering Understanding, in Knowledge Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, 
Responsibility, and Virtue, Matthias Steup ed., 248-49 (2001).  Se also Jason Baehr, Character, Reliability and 
Virtue Epistemology, 56 The Philosophical Quarterly 193 (2006). 
23 Code, supra note 16 at 44. 
24 James Monmarquet, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility, 21 (1993). 
25 Ibid. at 23. 
26 Jason Kawall, Other-Regarding Epistemic Virtues, 15(3) Ratio 257, 260 (2002). 
27 Jonathon Kvanvig, The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind (1992). 
28 Ibid. at 172. 
29 Ibid. at 176.  
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Finally, a Neo-Aristotelian account of virtue epistemology holds an integrative 
view of moral and epistemic virtues and argues that just as in Aristotelian moral virtues where 
both ‘motivational’ and ‘reliable success’ components are present, intellectual virtues also 
motivationally and reliably define justification.  An individual exhibiting intellectual courage, for 
instance, is motivated to persevere in her ideas out of a desire for truth and is reliably successful 
at doing so.30  Just as in moral virtues, intellectual virtues may conflict – intellectual courage and 
humility, or generosity and autonomy may pull in different directions.  In such cases, the agent 
relies on Aristotelian phronesis or the virtue of practical wisdom to balance the conflicting 
demands of a given situation and respond appropriately.31  
This is a sketch without a critical assessment of the contribution and shortcomings 
of various positions in virtue epistemology.  It nonetheless suffices to demonstrate the 
significance of a normative approach to epistemology.  The addition of intellectual character 
traits to cognitive faculties further moves our grasp of the world from mere perception and 
knowledge to understanding, wisdom and intellectual flourishing.  Virtue epistemologists 
interested in the social and ethical aspects of knowledge present intellectual courage, humility, 
practical wisdom, love of knowledge, generosity and autonomy, in philosophical depth, to 
outline the ways these virtues ought to guide our cognitive connection to the world,32 and the 
ways virtues and vices such as epistemic sensibility, temperance, or self-indulgence can promote 
or hinder intellectual flourishing.33  Notably, the virtue of epistemic justice requires “reflexive 
critical openness” to the voices of the less powerful and marginalized who are often dismissed 
due to various forms of cognitive and social prejudice.34  Originally discussed in the context of 
the politics of testimony,35 epistemic justice urges further reflection on questions of power and 
credibility on a considerably larger level of social and political inquiry.   
But how can responsibilism in virtue epistemology guide responsible and 
reflexive pedagogy? 
 
III. Virtue Pedagogy and Pedagogical Persona 
Teaching can be understood in three distinct but interrelated senses: as a practice, 
a role, or an activity.36  It seems to me that institutional and individual practices and roles 
adopted in order to realize the ends of teaching, normative as they might be, follow from an 
understanding of teaching as an activity.  I use the notion of a “pedagogical persona” to refer to 
the overall character which the agent adopts while conducting the activity of teaching rather than 
to various roles or practices she may follow to achieve defined ends through that persona.  This 
is partly inspired by what, in close similarity to scientific personae, Herman Paul calls ‘scholarly 
                                                          
30 For the most developed account, see Linda Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue 
and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge (1996). 
31 Roberts and Wood, supra note 20 at 311. 
32 See ibid. at 165, 206, 219, 250, 261, 293, and 311. 
33 See Heather Battaly, Epistemic Self-Indulgence, 41 Metaphilosophy 214 (2010). 
34 Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice and a Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing, 34 Metaphilosophy 154, 
154. 
35 See ibid. 154-61. 
36 David Carr, Making Sense of Education, 19 (2003). 
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persona’ in the philosophy of history,37 an ideal-typical model that allows for consideration of a 
constellation of features with which an activity is pursued rather than a single-focused 
embodiment of one episodic instance of scholarly engagement.  Paul introduces “scholarly 
personae as models of scholarly selfhood, or as models of abilities, attitudes, and dispositions 
that are considered to be crucial for the pursuit of scholarly study.”38  He draws out the 
implications of persona as a collection of virtues and skills to offer a more holistic understanding 
of what it means to be a historian, though nothing in his account limits the concept to scholarship 
or history as such.  For Paul, skills are the technical proficiency or mastery required to 
accomplish the tasks of a particular practice,39 but virtues are something more: “they are oriented 
toward goods that their practitioners recognize as constitutive of the practices (for example, 
moral inquiry, scholarly research, political deliberation) in which they find themselves 
engaged.”40 
As Paul admits, this conception of virtue has a constructivist element beyond its 
Aristotelian roots, which regard goods that define virtue as given and not subject to the 
individual’s discretion.  Under Paul’s model, virtues are not frozen in time, but are necessary to 
pursue the goods regarded as constitutive of a particular activity by its practitioners in a 
particular time.41  In agreement with Paul, I am not interested in a ‘moral’42 or ‘personal 
worth’43 conception of virtue.  However, I part ways with Paul’s constructivist understanding of 
virtue which is meant to give persona a temporal or contextual character.  Instead, I take persona 
to stand for the kind of selfhood that the agent, based on her understanding of the activity in 
question, defines for herself.  Virtues are human qualities and traits that normatively direct, 
rather than descriptively explain, the agent’s choice of persona and the particular ways she acts 
in that persona to achieve the desired ends of her activity with reliable success. 
More specifically, I use pedagogical personae to point to the kind of selves that 
agents, based on their understanding of the art or science of teaching as an activity, adopt and 
exhibit while they perform and engage in multiple roles and practices to achieve the ends of 
education.  Epistemic virtues, given the nature of the activity, seem to be the best candidates to 
guide the agent in her choice of the persona and resulting roles and practices.  Such rolls and 
practices may range from course designing, classroom teaching, research and independent study 
supervision, evaluation and any other operation that is ordinarily part of teaching activities.  
Pedagogy, taken broadly, implies an understanding of what is appropriate and what is 
inappropriate knowledge (again in a broad sense of those qualifiers) to impart through education 
and includes an “animating ethos” in a pedagogue.44 
                                                          
37 Herman Paul, What is a Scholarly Persona? Ten Theses on Virtues, Skills and Desires, 53(3) History and Theory 
348 (2014). 
38 Ibid. 353. 
39 Ibid. 358. 
40 Ibid. 359. 
41 Ibid. 
42 See Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, supra note 30 at 108.  I do not necessarily reject that a virtuous person is 
more likely to be a moral person than a nonvirtuous person, but as stated before, here I need not take any position on 
the relationship between virtue epistemology and virtue ethics. 
43 Jason Baehr, The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology, 88-111 (2012) cited in Paul, 
supra note 41 at 359. 
44 Max van Manen, Pedagogy, Virtue, and Narrative Identity in Teaching, 24(2) Curriculum Inquiry 135, 139 
(1994). 
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A case for virtue epistemology as an attractive normative account for assessing 
responsible pedagogy stands on solid legs of cognitive faculties and intellectual character traits 
in justification of pedagogical choices of all kinds.  The application of virtue theory to pedagogy, 
in particular when promoted through advocacy for the use of identity narrative and other non-
cognitive means to cultivate wisdom and understanding beyond the mere transfer of 
knowledge,45 has raised skepticism about the capacity of non-cognitive tools to avoid falsehood 
and deception and mistaking the particular for the universal.46  In response to that challenge, an 
advocate of virtue pedagogy argues that “there are forms of understanding that transcend the 
conceptual” and uses virtues such as “pedagogical tact,” “personal presence,” “discipline,” and 
“patience” to respond to both “conceptual and cognitive” and “evocative and noncognitive” 
dimensions in human science inquiry.47  This is hardly a response, as ‘understanding’ in human 
science inquiry need not be noncognitive.  Besides, the virtues invoked are also too general and 
too blunt to contribute much by way of effective and sharp checks and balances against the folly 
of pure subjectivism. 
Here is precisely where virtue epistemology, as compared to other forms of virtue 
theory, remains unparalleled for the value of its emphasis on demanding norms of cognitive 
justification in line with desired normative social or ethical implications.  As alluded to earlier, 
the dividing line between virtue epistemologists focusing on reliable cognitive faculties and the 
responsibilists is one of difference of emphasis rather than a choice between cognitive and 
noncognitive features or stronger and weaker cognitive capacity.  Cognitive and character related 
intellectual virtues together accommodate historical and social situatedness of knowledge 
without sacrificing measures of reliability.  Qualities such as open-mindedness, integrity, 
conscientiousness, tenacity, thoroughness and so on may seem too abstract and global to direct 
the pedagogical agent in a meaningful way to pursue her activity that is both reliable and 
context-sensitive.  But it is in fact the virtue of practical wisdom that enables the agent to 
interpret the demands of intellectual character traits on the inquiry and balance between such 
demands in case of arising conflicts. 
Once the agent defines her pedagogical persona according to her understanding of 
the activity – what teaching is all about and what kinds of goods it pursues as the ends justifying 
the activity toward the ultimate end of intellectual well-being – virtues as normative qualities act 
both as a critical means to and partly constitutive of intellectual well-being to guide various roles 
and practices embedded in the activity.  Global as epistemic virtues might be, their interpretation 
and application in context as normative guides under the light of practical wisdom is the agent’s 
responsibility.  There is no reason to hold intellectual character virtues exempt from critical 
reflection.  But the broad agency of the individual in interpretation and balancing of the 
normative demands of these virtues will leave ample room for context-sensitivity. 
Different skills and abilities distinguish teachers in what kind of technical tasks 
they can tackle, but different intellectual dispositions and attitudes distinguish between more or 
less normatively justified pedagogical choices.  The implications of virtues for international law 
teaching are no less salient than an agent-based approach to pedagogy deserves.  To make sense 
                                                          
45 For a prime example, see ibid. 
46 Gary D. Fenstermacher, On the Virtues of van Manen's Argument: A Response to "Pedagogy, Virtue, and 
Narrative Identity in Teaching," 24(2) Curriculum Inquiry 215 (1994). 
47 Max van Manen, The Pain of Science: Rejoining Fenstermacher’s Response, 24(2) Curriculum Inquiry 221, 226-
27 (1994). 
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of the normative relevance and significance of virtues, defined as such, for international law 
teaching, let us consider a few instances of pedagogical problem-areas that manifest the 
operation of virtue theory for the inquiring agent.  The coverage is admittedly eclectic and the 
exercise intended to draw attention to the resulting inquiry and questions to be asked under a 
virtue account rather than to provide a blueprint.  Befitting the normative approach it advocates, 
in a way it speaks of the author’s dispositions and attitudes, and so with luck, the invoked virtues 
ought to point to the right questions and guard against intellectual self-indulgence as well. 
 
IV. Virtue Pedagogy and International Law Teaching 
Contra international law teaching, international legal scholarship has invited some 
serious reflections on the role of scholars as agents in their connection to the world through 
scholarly intervention.  Normative views of the role or responsibilities of international legal 
scholars posit a collective as a community.  Whether this collective is an epistemic community 
built on common forms of access to and production of knowledge, an interpretive community 
reflecting common forms of reading legal texts, or simply a professional community, divergence 
of ideas about the justificatory goals of its scholarly production is sharp enough to extend along 
different theories about law.   
On one extreme of some illustrative recent accounts, a detached scholarly position 
must contain ‘second-order legal scholarship’ to the analysis of the origin and doctrinal structure 
of norms, their influence on perceptions and preferences, and their interaction with one another – 
a tempered exercise of the far more extreme Kelsenian ‘reflexive distance’ position.48  
Reconciling positivism and politics, ‘critical positivism’ takes rules seriously as it urges full 
sensitivity to the socio-economic and ideological context of their creation.49  Inspired by virtue 
ethics, a creative reading of Martti Koskenniemi’s ‘culture of formalism’ understands it to be a 
recognition of the demands of individual ethical responsibility on, among others, international 
law scholars.50  Another stance perhaps at the other extreme end of current outlooks on 
positioning international law scholars, and in my view also closely related to virtue ethics, is one 
that understands professional (and individual) ‘sensibilities’ as “disciplinary habits of thought, 
assumptions, and dispositions” that invite international law scholars to a more reflective 
consideration of their individual and collective ethical responsibilities.51  This last account adds 
another crucial element to ‘sensibility’ for effective agency, which is a proper cognitive 
infrastructure to organize responsible engagement with the world.52 
To fill the lacuna of an agent-based approach to international law teaching, 
epistemic virtues help guide this recognition – sensibility – in a responsible manner.  If, as 
suggested before, epistemic virtues are the best normative candidates to guide the agent in her 
                                                          
48 Jochen von Bernstorff, International Legal Scholarship as a Cooling Medium in International Law and Politics, 
25(4) Eur. J. Int’l L. 977, 990 (2014).  For a simpler account wary of accountability of scholars to the ‘scientific 
community’, ‘the truth’, and ‘the public’, see Anne Peters, Realizing Utopia as a Scholarly Endeavour, 24(2) Eur. J. 
Int’l L. 533, 540 (2013). 
49 Realizing Utopia: the Future of International Law, Antonio Cassese ed., xvii (2012). 
50 Jan Klabbers, Towards a Culture of Formalism? Martti Koskenniemi and the Virtues, 27 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L. 
J. 417, 420-21 (2013). 
51 Andrew Lang and Susan Marks, People with Projects: Writing the Lives of International Lawyers, 27 Temp. Int’l 
& Comp. L. J. 437, 449 (2013). 
52 Ibid. 452. 
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choice of pedagogical persona and resulting roles and practices, it is because they include habits, 
dispositions, skills, and attitudes under both cognitive faculties and intellectual character traits.  
Virtue pedagogy, then, takes account of dispositions, attitudes and habits in the pedagogical 
agent as it also insists on a cognitive infrastructure that is epistemically both reliable and 
responsible. 
Take, for instance, critical approaches to international law teaching.  Decades on, 
the critique against reproduction of hierarchy through legal education53 and the later call for 
politicization of the classroom54 still undeniably reverberate through understandings of critical 
pedagogy in (international) law.  At their core, such efforts cut through various forms of 
contingency of knowledge while their emancipatory ideals aspire to expose the role of hegemony 
and power in its formation.  It would be reductive to seek one uniform definition and associated 
methods for critical pedagogy in general.55  Grounded in the critiques of the Frankfurt School 
and especially Herbert Marcuse against the role of schools in solidifying authority and 
undermining the necessary social consciousness for social change,56 various concerns have 
preoccupied critical pedagogy theories in the past few decades.  These aspirations unite in urging 
anti-oppressive praxis57 centering on race, gender, nationality, ethnicity, sexuality, and so on.  In 
their post-modern incarnation, they go so far as to advocate a global decolonizing role for 
education by, for instance, reviving indigenous knowledge.58 
Critical legal pedagogy, in turn, shares similar ideals.  At times, explicitly relying 
on a Gramscian anti-hegemonic framework, it envisions decolonizing the self and society 
through ‘identity politics as anti-subordination praxis’.59  Critical international law pedagogy, 
too, has fed on strands of identity politics, with Third World Approaches to International Law 
(TWAIL) perhaps having inspired the most inclusive manifestation of critical ideals of education 
in international law.60  TWAIL’s theoretical commitment to emancipation, equality, positional 
parity, agency for change, empowerment, anti-subordination, historicity, contextualism, anti-
dualism, inclusion, and expansion of the political informs a pedagogical approach that contains, 
but goes well beyond, mere identity politics.61  The subversive nature of such reorientation aims 
to do more than merely challenge banking models of education, in which the teacher deposits 
information into passive deposit boxes as pupils, and which are the main target of critical 
pedagogy theories.62  It does not remain content, then, with a reproduction of a hierarchical 
relationship where the pedagogue only transfers TWAIL teachings as a transaction.  Instead, it 
places the pedagogue in a non-hierarchical, dialogical relationship with the pupil to explore 
                                                          
53 D Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. Leg. Educ. 591 (1982). 
54 Duncan Kennedy, Politicizing the Classroom, 4 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women’s Stud 81 (1994). 
55 For a qualitative study of different understandings of the concept among self-identified pedagogues, see Mary 
Breuing, Problematizing Critical Pedagogy 3(3) Int’l J. Crit. Pedagogy 2 (2011). 
56 See e.g. Michael Apple, Education and Power (1982). 
57 Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1970) is often regarded as the first theoretical articulation of critical 
pedagogy. 
58 See in particular, Sandy Grande, Red Pedagogy: Native American Social and Political Thought (2004). 
59 See e.g., Francisco Valdes, Outsider Jurisprudence, Critical Pedagogy and Social Justice Activism: Marking the 
Stirrings of Critical Legal Education, 10 Asian A. L. J. 65 (2003). 
60 Mohsen al-Attar & Vernon Tava, TWAIL Pedagogy: Legal Education for Emancipation, XV PalestineY. Of Int’l 
L. 7 (2009).  
61 See ibid. for one attempt at detailing an actual experience with designing a course on this basis.  
62 Freire, supra note 57 at 53.  For a superb example of dissent against the banking model in international law 
teaching, see Otto, supra note 6. 
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together alternative theoretical sources for knowledge through the context of often-ignored sites 
and voices for emancipatory praxes. 
If this summary is accurate, I propose that all the axes of critical international law 
pedagogy, understood as such, would normatively benefit from an agent-based approach 
governed by epistemic virtues.   
To start with the non-hierarchical and dialogical nature of the pedagogue-pupil 
relationship, it ought to be asked what exactly symmetry – invoked to question traditional 
sources of authority including those of the pedagogue – means in this context.63  If symmetry 
refers to the space given to the pupil to reason and analyze the material independently, that in 
and of itself may not carry much distinctive analytical weight as a characteristic of this 
relationship to argue for it in a theory of education.64  But if symmetry refers to epistemic or 
pedagogical parity between the pedagogue and pupil, then it is dubious how that could ensure the 
realization of telos of critical teaching – training with appropriate cognitive tools for effective 
agency for change and emancipation.   
The fact that dialogical exploration of sources of domination, old and new, guards 
against a robotic reproduction of the teacher’s preoccupations gives it legitimacy.  But the 
pedagogue, by virtue of practice, is more likely to have cultivated intellectual character traits 
such as open-mindedness and generosity and be able to exercise appropriate cognitive tools to 
interpret, identify, and debunk traditional sources of knowledge that reinforce or neutralize 
various ploys of domination.  Destruction of the canon needs no less epistemic responsibility 
than multiplication of new, more inclusive sources of knowledge.  Positivism and formalism, as 
often the easiest targets of critical international law pedagogy,65 are weighty adversaries worthy 
of necessary cognitive and virtuous intellectual character traits already developed in the 
pedagogue to be imparted in the process of critical education. 
The search for alternative theoretical sources of knowledge also needs epistemic 
justification.  Theoretical inclinations, particularly outside the natural world, to a large extent 
reflect dispositions or temperaments.  Empiricism or abstract thinking, social and ethical    
implications attributed to different theoretical orientations, and distinctive methodological 
demands associated with different theoretical perspectives appeal to scholars partly based on 
diverging temperaments.  Yet, although sensibilities partly explain theoretical choices, they do 
not justify them.  Theories need cognitive rather than metacognitive justification.   
To teach dissent from dominant theoretical approaches in favor of new 
explanatory or normative theories requires, first and foremost, full engagement with those 
approaches on their own terms.  Whether through ‘narrowing of the focus followed by a 
broadening of perspective”66 in which several theoretical frameworks are brought to bear on a 
particular problem-area, a phenomenological approach which finds a case to be worth 
                                                          
63 I borrow Martha Nussbaum’s reference to ‘pedagogical symmetry’ to refer to the rejection of a hierarchical 
relationship here, without engaging with her particular elaboration on the subject.  See The Therapy of Desire, 340 
infra (2009). 
64 For an essentially similar, but more complex, critique of Nussbaum’s articulation of pedagogical symmetry, see 
David Moltow, Pedagogical Symmetry and the Cultivation of Humanity: Nussbaum, Seneca and Symmetry in the 
Teacher-Pupil Relationship, 13(1-2) Arts and Humanities in Higher Education 115, 117 (2014). 
65 See e.g., al-Attar & Tava, supra note 60 at 23. 
66 Simpson, supra note 3 at 89. 
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anatomizing “when it both typifies and enacts fundamental legal controversies of the sort that go 
on in a variety of distinct substantive settings,”67 or a purely abstract comparative study of 
theoretical orientations towards the global legal order, critical pedagogy must teach how to push 
the object  of critique to its limit, on its own terms, to expose its ills.  Rational choice 
approaches, for instance, can hardly withstand the philosophical scrutiny of ‘self’ and 
‘rationality’ if the pedagogue takes their claims seriously to develop a critique from within rather 
than without.  Sociological claims of human rights norm internalization may well fall short if 
assessed against valid empirical observations.  Likewise, procedural accounts of legitimacy 
betray a tall order of assumptions of substantive justice for a pluralistic global community.  But 
that will become obvious only if they are taken seriously on their detailed claims rather than 
dismissed offhand.68 
In short, the association of theories with political or ethical orientations and 
methodological choices must be proved rather than assumed.  Critical pedagogy’s legitimacy 
owes to how it takes this as both a responsibility and an opportunity.  Shortcut descriptors such 
as anti-subordination and universalism cannot do the filtering job alone.  Theories feeding 
critical international legal pedagogy are susceptible to unwarranted universalism as well.  Our 
understanding of social phenomena – revolutions, urbanization, immigration, social movements 
and so on – could draw from large-scale, grand critical social and political theories of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries too in such a way as to lose touch with particularities of 
various locales to which our limited cognitive tools may not afford access.  Epistemic virtues 
urge the critical pedagogue to take her dispositions seriously, treat them reflexively, and acquire 
habits that are in line with intellectual virtues of humility, courage, open-mindedness and 
impartiality, autonomy, and conscientiousness in order to teach how to responsibly question the 
canon and develop new theories against subordination and colonization of the self and society. 
Most notably, critical international law pedagogy’s reliance on alternative sites 
and marginalized voices for more inclusive sources of knowledge and emancipatory praxis 
responds to demands of epistemic justice.  These narratives are retrievable on the streets of the 
metropole as much as in “relatable hinterlands.”69  Notwithstanding what form suppression and 
convenient collective amnesia have historically taken, these sites and voices have continued to 
share a second-class fate, and with that the welfare of millions. 
Again, dispositions by and large determine which voices call out to us more 
audibly and to what extent we take them to represent indefensible oppressive practices.  Yet we 
need reliable discriminating capacity to select and treat such alternative narratives as media for 
new knowledge.  Any objection against such selectivity could preemptively be addressed by the 
fact that our cognitive tools and emotive resources are inevitably limited, and so we constantly 
select those narratives that we can access and identify with over those we cannot and do not.  
Epistemic virtues enable the agent to discriminate consciously and legitimately and guard against 
both arbitrariness and subjectivism.  A commitment to self-criticality in the pedagogue would 
ensure both intellectual reliability and responsibility in the selection, presentation and 
interpretation of narratives whose reach goes beyond the idiosyncrasies of personal identity.  
Self-criticality, however, is not non-cognitive.  Rather, it calls for both appropriate cognitive 
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faculties to reliably relate to the existing knowledge and intellectual character traits to 
responsibly open the space for new sources. 
By shifting the focus from the disciplinary or institutional identity of the field to 
the agency of the pedagogue, virtue pedagogy poses demanding epistemic requirements on 
teaching international law as a vocation that fosters intellectual well-being both as an end in 
itself and as a means to more democratic processes of constructing emancipatory knowledge.  
The 1990s divide between critical and mainstream international law teaching crucially raised 
consciousness toward institutional recognition of critical teaching as a heresy.  But those defined 
boundaries are now behind us.  Critical orientations in international law – even the factions 
specifically inspired by TWAIL – proceed with very different moral and political priorities and, 
at times, converge around only a faith in emancipatory praxes.  What is conveniently termed 
mainstream also carries various interdisciplinary flags and acts on diverging interests.  So the old 
framing does not seem to be as analytically sharp as it may once have been, nor is it proving 
strategically productive.  Moreover, the vast waves of information vying for students' attention 
seems to deflate concerns about banking models of education in a law school course on 
international law.  Rather than relying on classic dichotomies and longstanding critiques of 
education as hierarchy, we ought to focus our individual and collective efforts on fostering 
critical international law pedagogy as an epistemically robust and responsible intellectual 
enterprise. 
This is ever more urgent considering that a network of critical approaches is 
increasingly in a dialogue and that mobility, digital and otherwise, is the new career reality.  
How would we teach international law critically to a classroom in a country whose plight of 
various kinds has animated our critical theories but which has no share of its own in critical 
scholarly literature?  The majority of theoretical sources guiding critical international law 
approaches still come in English.  We can overcome linguistic barriers more easily, but lexicon 
barriers require patience and strong intellectual tools to maneuver.  What should we make, for 
example, of the reception of critical work examining the adverse consequences of feminist 
interventions in international human rights and humanitarian law's treatment of women in peace 
and war by a class of female lawyers in a country where years of their life were limited to 
seclusion and professional retardation by an oppressive regime that confined them to darkness?  
How to convince young, aspiring lawyers about the costs associated with using the language of 
international human rights in a context where defense of civil and political rights still defines life 
and death?  The question is not over strategies, as survival tactics have often taught these 
students enough wickedly pragmatic wisdom to find their way around.  It is rather a question 
about the future of critical pedagogy not just in what it teaches but also in what it learns.  It is 
about urging agency in pedagogues to acquire skills, habits and dispositions to transcend homey 
personal identities, if and when needed, and exercise self-criticality in an epistemically 
responsible way.  It is also about adopting sufficient artistic expression and practical wisdom, 
from humanities or other cognitive fields, not to have to present the complicated truth as a lie or 
as a subjective choice of a narrative. 
